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THE UTILIZATION OF EYETRACKING TO UNDERSTAND ATTENTION
SWITCHING IN SOCIALLY ANXIOUS AND DEPRESSED INDIVIDUALS
ALLISON E. GRIESMER
ABSTRACT
Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and major depressive disorder
(MDD) have demonstrated differences in attention bias processing, leading to a
differential processing of the world around them. As such, there is a pressing need to
further understand these hypothesized attentional biases to lend to improved therapeutic
deliveries. The present study utilized a novel eye-tracking paradigm to understand
attentional biases in individuals with disorder-specific symptomology of SAD and MDD.
A sample of 103 undergraduates completed measures of social anxiety, depression and a
novel eye-tracking paradigm. Results showed that a combination of elevated SAD and
MDD symptoms lends to a slower disengagement time from negative stimuli when
compared to healthy control participants, regardless of negatively valenced stimuli (sad
or disgust face). Contrary to expectation, individuals with elevated MDD symptoms did
not demonstrate an overall difference in disengagement practices when compared to
control participants.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Major depressive disorder (MDD) and social anxiety disorder (SAD) are
common, highly comorbid, and debilitating in nature. Independent lifetime prevalence
rates of both disorders range from 13%-16%, with 37% of those diagnosed with one
disorder evidencing clinical threshold of the other (Kessler, 2012). These high
comorbidity rates are surpassed only by the personal and societal costs associated with
the two disorders, which exceed 44.4 billion dollars annually in the United States
(Collins, Westra, Dozois, & Burns, 2004). Given that anxiety disorders often precede the
onset of MDD (Dalrymple & Zimmermann, 2011), identifying specific mechanisms that
presage the onset of each disorder may inform prevention efforts, and perhaps reduce the
risk of their sequelae.
Traditional models of both disorders point to disrupted attention processes as
potential mechanisms for both disorders, with difficulties disengaging from emotioncongruent information linked to each (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Gotlib &
Joormann, 2010; Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, and Joorman, 2013). Specifically
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anxiety is believed to be linked to threat-appraisal in both the early stage of attention
(Mathews & MacLeod 1994; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), coupled with
downstream cognitive processing of social stressors (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016),
while depression is associated with voluntary attentional bias towards dysphoric stimuli
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Emergent literature points to difficulty in attention
shifting away from dysphoric stimuli as specific to depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010;
Donaldson, Lam, Mathews, 2007; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2003).
Empirical findings have been mixed with respect to the role of attention biases in
the two disorders, with some supporting the above noted pattern of attention processing
(Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Holas, Krejtz, Cypryanska & Nezlek, 2014;
Joorman & D’Avanato, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Mathews & Mackintosh,
1998; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg, Millar & Bradley,
2000; Perez, Baños, Ruipérez & Belloch, 1999; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003; Yiend &
Mathews, 2001), and other failing to note such distinctions (Gotlib et al., 2004; LeMoult,
Yoon, & Joormann, 2012; Kirkanski, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2014). Such mixed results
may, in part, stem from the use of behavioral measures of attention that are confounded
with motor activity in their measurement of attention responses. Efforts to overcome such
limitations have employed eye tracking methodologies that do not require motor
movement to ascertain indices of visual attention. However, these efforts have largely
revolved around studying bias during naturalistic viewing paradigms, such as Stroop
tasks or dot-probe tasks, in which participants’ attention preferences are measured. Thus,
it remains unclear whether SAD and MDD evidence differential patterns in disengaging
attention away from disorder-specific stimuli.
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The present study aims to overcome the above noted limitations in the literature
by examining attention disengagement to disorder-specific stimuli as a mechanism for
understanding attention biases for SAD versus MDD. In the sections below, further
information on each disorder is provided, and a rational for the hypothesized disorderspecific attention deficits is discussed.
1.1 Major Depressive and Social Anxiety Disorder
Major Depressive Disorder is characterized by both anhedonia and sustained
sadness, and is one of the most common mental health disorders in the United States.
Over a one-year period, an estimated 15.7 million adults living in the United States
suffered from at least one episode of MDD (Kessler et al., 2005). The median onset age
for MDD is 32 years old, with prevalence rates between 20-26% for women and 8-12%
for their male counterparts (Journal of the American Medical Association, 1996). The
onset of depression demonstrates a chronic course, however, improvement of symptoms
after four to six weeks of psychotherapy are above 80% (National Institute of Health,
1998).
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is characterized by an excessive fear of social or
performance situations in which the individual is concerned or embarrassed about
performing inadequately or displaying visible anxiety symptoms in front of others. This
disorder is one of the most common and chronic forms of anxiety disorders (Kircanski,
Joormann, Gotlib, 2015), affecting 13% of the US population during their lifetime
(Belzer, McKee, & Liebowitz, 2005; Kessler, 2013), and 7% within a given year (Kessler
et al., 2005). SAD is the fourth most common psychological disorder worldwide (Kessler,
2005; Weeks, Howell, & Goldin, 2013). Unlike MDD, SAD demonstrates an
adolescence onset, and exhibits a chronic course, with recovery falling below a 40% rate
3

over a decade follow-up period (Bruce et al., 2005; Kircanski, Joorman, & Gotlib, 2014).
Indeed, estimates suggest that over one-third of those with SAD wait over 10 years
before seeking treatment (Kaufman & Baucom, 2014), which speaks to the chronic
course of the disorder.
1.2 Models of Major Depression and Social Anxiety Disorders
Major Depression Disorder. Cognitive models of MDD propose that depression
is caused and maintained by biases in the processing of emotional information (Beck,
1979; Bower, 1981; Sanchez et al., 2013; Teasdale, 1988). Beck (1976) postulated that
existing memory representations, or schemas, lead individuals to filter stimuli from the
environment such that their attention is directed toward information that is congruent
with their schemas. Beck (1976) further theorized that the schemas of depressed persons
include themes of loss, separation, failure, worthlessness, and rejection; consequently,
depressed individuals will exhibit a systematic bias in their processing of environmental
stimuli or information that is relevant to these themes. Because of this bias, depressed
people attend selectively to negative stimuli in their environment and interpret neutral
and ambiguous stimuli in a schema-congruent way (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
Moreover, dysfunctional schemas and processing biases are presumed to endure beyond
the depressive episode, representing stable vulnerability factors for depression onset and
recurrence. When the dysfunctional schemas are activated by stressors, specific negative
cognitions are generated that take the form of automatic thoughts and revolve around
pessimistic views about the self, the world, and the future (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
Thus, governed by these dysfunctional schemas, a depression-prone individual
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selectively attends to mood congruent information that maintains their dysphoric states
that progress into the clinical manifestation of the disorder.
In regards to disengagement practices, Koster, Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De
Raedt (2011) propose the impaired disengagement hypothesis as a means to explain
disengagement practices among individuals with high depressive symptomology. This
hypothesis posits that the prolonged processing of self-referent material is due to
impaired attentional disengagement from negative self-referent information (Koster,
Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011), which can account for prolonged
disengagement time among individuals with high depressive symptoms. As such, when
depressed individuals are exposed to mood-congruent, negative stimuli, such as sad faces,
extended disengagement time are observed (Koster, Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt,
2011). This extension of disengagement time is hypothesized to be a result of individuals
demonstrating a difficulty to exercise attentional control in response to negative thoughts,
thus likely experiencing persistent rumination.
Difficulties disengaging from negative stimuli may preclude depressed
individuals from utilizing effective emotion regulation strategies such as distraction when
confronted with stressful events, resulting in sustained processing of negative
information, which can lead to prolonged negative affect (Sanchez et al., 2013).
Additionally, these attentional bias may interfere with an individual’s ability to reframe
the presented negative stimuli through stimuli reappraisal (Sanchez et al., 2013).
Difficulties with attentional disengagement may contribute to rumination of negatively
valenced stimuli (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011).
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Social Anxiety Disorder. Cognitive theories of SAD posit that the main process of
SAD is self-directed attention triggered by social situations, with a corresponding
withdrawal of adaptive attention to positive external cues (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997). Models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995) predict that information
processing biases play a role in the maintenance of the disorder’s psychopathology.
Current evidence suggests that SAD increases attentional threat biases. Studies have
supported this assumption by showing that individuals with a high level of social anxiety
tend to display an attentional bias towards external threats, and a greater likelihood of
favoring the threatening meaning of ambiguous cues (Peschard & Philippot, 2015).
Furthermore, Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) theory posits that individuals with SAD
come to view the world as a harsh and critical place, and consequently conduct their lives
as though they are under the constant scrutiny of others. Socially anxious individuals are
said to generate and attend to a negative self-impression based on their prior beliefs,
feelings, and self-image. Subsequent self-evaluation of social performance is then driven
by this negative self-impression, rather than by external feedback from others (Abbott &
Rapee, 2004).
As previously noted, attention bias to threat (e.g., disgust faces) is a cognitive
vulnerability factor for social anxiety that occurs in the early stages of information
processing (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016). The utilization of disgust faces for
threatening stimuli derives from the idea that socially anxious individuals scan their
environment for feedback from their peers (Peschard & Philippot, 2015). Thus, a “disgust
face”, which is indicative of negative social feedback, would be viewed by someone with
social anxiety as threatening. Individuals with elevated levels of SAD tend to exhibit
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longer time to engage with threatening stimuli, but also exhibit late stage cognitive
processing following the presentation of threatening stimuli, thus leading to longer
disengagement times. By understanding engagement and disengagement practices of
socially anxious individuals with regards to threatening stimuli, the etiology,
maintenance, and treatment of SAD can be improved upon. Schofield et al. (2012) have
investigated disengagement practices among socially anxious individuals, concluding that
people with high levels of social anxiety were in fact slower to divert their attention away
from disgust stimuli.
Additionally, Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano (2016) propose that post-event
processing (PEP) is associated with disengagement practices among socially anxious
individuals. PEP refers to repeated thinking about and reevaluation of the negative
aspects of one’s performance after a social situation (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016),
which is crucially important when considering cognitive vulnerability and maintenance
factors of social anxiety symptoms. Thus, Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano (2016) posit that
when individuals are experiencing high levels of social anxiety, they will take longer to
disengage due to their attention to and subsequent dwelling on the presented stimuli. In a
study conducted by Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, (2016), participants were exposed to
stimuli of happy, sad, disgust, and neutral faces and disengagement practices were
observed using an eye-tracker with the goal of understanding attentional biases with
disgust stimuli in socially anxious participants. Overall, Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano
(2016) determined that individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety demonstrated
longer disengagement times along with longer PEP times. This novel finding by Çek,
Sanchez, & Timpano (2016) elucidates the idea that socially anxious people dwell, and
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take longer to process, presented threatening stimuli, thus demonstrating difficulty
diverting their attention away from the presented threat.
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CHAPTER II
ATTENTIONAL BIASES

It is well established that the scope of attentional focus is limited, that there can be
only one focus of attention at a given time, and that only information selected to be
attended to undergoes extensive processing (Sears et al., 2010). Attention functions via
selecting relevant stimuli in the environment for further scrutiny (Lavie et al., 2004).
Because of this, when multiple sources of information compete for visual attention, an
individual must prioritize visual allocation by shifting the focus of their attention from
one source to another (Sears et al., 2010). Researchers studying selective attention in
clinical populations have discovered attentional biases in the allocation of attentional
foci, such that concern-related or mood-congruent material is given priority (Sears et al.,
2010).
Attention biases in depression and social anxiety have largely been examined with
respect to selective attention engagement (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012), which reflects
preferential attention allocation towards or away from a given stimulus. Attention biases
may also reflect difficulty switching, or disengaging attention away from valenced
stimuli, which somewhat reflects a capture of attention processes (Armstrong &
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Olantunji, 2012). While there is some evidence for attention bias in both MDD and SAD,
cognitive theories predict differential attentional deficits across the two disorders.
2.1 Attention Bias in Major Depressive Disorder
As previously noted, cognitive theories of depression posit that depression risk
stems, in part, from negative information processing that is governed by, and filtered
through, negative self-schemas (e.g., Beck 1979, 1987). This information processing
involves biased allocation of attention, which reflects directed attention towards schemacongruent information in the environment (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews,
1997).
Despite a clear theoretical basis for biased attention processing in depression,
empirical findings on such biases in depression have been mixed. For example, Beck's
(1976) model predicts that depression should be associated with an attentional bias for
mood-congruent stimuli. Thus, mood-congruent interference effects should be present for
depressed populations when compared with controls, which could be measured via the
Stroop task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1986). The Stroop task asks participants to look at
color words and proceed to read them aloud. Interestingly, the names of the color (i.e.:
“red”) is printed in a different color ink, such as blue. The “Stroop effect” is then
observed, as participants will sometimes state the color of the printed word while
disregarding the actual word that is printed. The “Stroop effect” is observed differently in
individuals with disorder-specific symptomology. Research has shown that depressed
populations exhibit inconsistent depression-related Stroop effects and strong memory
biases (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mineka, Watson, & Clark,
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Williams et al., 1988). For instance, while some have
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observed slower word and color naming performance on the Stroop among depressed
participants, presumably indicating greater attention interference (Kertzman et al., 2010),
others found that depressed individuals outperformed their non-depressed peers
(Markela-Lerenc et al., 2006) in color-naming words.
Similar mixed findings were observed using the visual dot probe paradigm that
examines biased attention allocation by priming the participants with a dot to the location
of valenced and non-valenced words or faces in the visual field (Fritzsche et al., 2010;
Gotlib et al, 2004a, b; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg et al., 1995; Rinck &
Becker, 2005). For example, in a series of studies, Gotlib and colleagues (Gotlib, Kasch,
et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007) found
clinically depressed participants exhibit an attentional bias toward sad faces. These
findings were independently replicated by Fritzsche et al. (2010), who confirmed an
attention bias towards sad faces and a bias away from happy faces among individuals
who were in the middle of a depression episode. In contrast, others failed to show
attentional biases among depressed participants who were exposed to negatively valenced
words (Rinck & Becker, 2005) or faces (Mogg et al., 1995).
There is a surprising dearth of work that examines biased attention switching in
depressed participants. Attention switching can be defined as one’s ability to visually
engage with specific stimuli, then diverting your visual attention to another presented
stimulus in the same visual field. Although most emotional stimuli could initially draw
our attentional focus, it is adaptive for people to shift away from that information if it
poses no immediate relevance. Here, individuals will shift their attention elsewhere, as it
would be maladaptive for a person to continue focusing on certain information
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(particularly negative information) that no longer holds value. However, individuals with
mood disorders, such as MDD or SAD, tend to perseverate on negative stimuli, which
could be reflected in attentional inflexibility in response to disorder-specific inputs (such
as disgust or sad faces).
The disengagement, or lack thereof, from negative stimuli can be framed in terms
of attention switching processes. Due to certain cognitive mechanisms underlying these
disorders, such as rumination in MDD or post-even processing (PEP) in SAD,
disengagement from negative stimuli becomes a challenging task. Overall, individuals are
less able to divert their attention from stimuli that is resonating with their symptomology.
Attention switching is important when attempting to understand how depressed
individuals interpret social interactions, thus impacting how these individuals regulate
their emotions (Sanchez, Romero, & De Raedt, 2017). While some researchers have
found that depressed individuals are characterized by deficits in emotional processing
(Carton et al., 1999; Rubinow & Post, 1992), other researchers have independently failed
to replicate these findings (Ridout et al., 2009). Such inconsistent results may in part be
attributed to the use of low intensity stimuli, such as negatively valenced words, that may
be insufficient to evoke adequate attention capture among depressed individuals. Indeed,
the use of negative valenced faces has been shown to more robustly evoke attention
biases among depressed persons (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), that may in turn be
evidenced in their difficulty disengaging from negatively valenced information (De Raedt
& Koster, 2010; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010).
Sanchez et al., (2013)’s approach to understanding shifting biases in MDD
participants consisted of presenting stimuli that comprised emotional (happy, sad, and
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disgust) and neutral facial expressions of the same person. These facial expression
pictures were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database
(Lundqvisk, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Each trial started with a black screen for 500 ms,
followed by the display of a white fixation cross in the middle of a black screen for 500
ms. A white random 1-digit number (ranging from 1 to 9) replaced the fixation cross,
appearing in the center for 1,000 ms. Participants were instructed to fixate on the number
and say it aloud as quickly as possible. Immediately after the offset of the 1-digit number,
a pair of faces (either happy-neutral, angry-neutral, or sad-neutral) was presented for
3,000 ms and participants were told to freely watch the screen without constraints.
Fixation data was recorded with the eye-tracker during the 3,000 ms period and was used
to estimate three indices of naturalistic processing employed in previous research: initial
orientation, fixation frequency, and fixation time (Sanchez et al., 2013). Results showed
that dysphoric and depressed participants evidenced difficulty disengaging visual
attention away from sad faces (Sanchez et al., 2013). Given these slower disengagement
times from sad faces in depressed and dysphoric participants, this proposes that moodcongruent stimuli impacts visual attention. Specifically, Sanchez et al.’s (2013) study
confirms that depression is associated with difficulties disengaging attention from
depression-related stimuli, such as sad faces. The depressed participants were slower to
disengage from sad faces relative to control group participants, while the control group
did not demonstrate attentional engagements or disengagements difficulties from other
emotional stimuli, (i.e., angry faces, happy faces) (Sanchez et al., 2013). Specifically,
depressed participants demonstrated an overall slower disengagement from sad stimuli
when compared to the control groups. These difficulties disengaging could be
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representative of deficits in inhibitory control, resulting in the prolonged processing of
negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented visual information, hindering recovery from
negative moods and leading to an overall sustained negative affect within the depressive
episode (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Sanchez et al., 2013) This novel methodology to
attention bias in depressed individuals is thought to be associated with a lack of inhibitory
control over negative information and with the use of maladaptive emotion regulation
strategies, which would result in sustained negative affect (Sanchez, Romero, & De
Raedt, 2017).
Sanchez et al.’s (2013) study sought to understand if depressed individuals took
longer to disengage from mood-congruent stimuli as a result of prolonged processing of
negative stimuli. This difficulty in disengaging could be a result of deficits in inhibitory
control (Sanchez et al., 2013). Malfunctioning inhibition of irrelevant negative stimuli
could result in prolonged processing of negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented
information and thereby hindering recovery from negative mood and leading to the
sustained negative affect that characterizes depressive episodes (Sanchez et al., 2013;
Gotlib & Joorman, 2010).
In summary, there is mixed evidence to suggest that depression is associated with
biased attention towards mood-congruent stimuli, such as sadness (Gotlib & Joormann,
2010; Sanchez et al., 2013), and not in response to threat (Williams et al., 1988). Further,
emerging evidence using eye tracking methods suggests that depression is linked to
deficits in the capacity to disengage attention from sadness-related material, due to a
deficit in inhibitory controls of cognitive processing.
2.2 Attention Bias in Social Anxiety Disorder
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As previously noted, cognitive theories of social anxiety posit that social anxiety
risk stems, in part, from preferentially attending to socially threatening information and
thus exhibits enhanced memory for presented information. Accordingly, SAD is
associated with quick detection and immediate attention to relevant stimuli, even when
stimuli are presented subliminally (LeMoult, Yoon, & Joormann, 2012b).
Despite a clear theoretical basis for biased attention in social anxiety disorder,
empirical findings on such biases in SAD are mixed. For example, while, as expected,
socially threatening information has been shown to interfere in processing nonthreatening information for socially anxious individuals on the Stroop task (Mogg et al.,
1995), others showed that anxious individuals process information slower than their
anxiety-free peers irrespective of whether the information is socially threatening (Mattia,
Heimberg, & Hope, 1992). Similar mixed findings were noted though the utilization of
the dot probe paradigm (Fritzsche et al., 2010; Gotlib et al, 2004a, b; MacLeod, Mathews,
& Tata, 1986; Mogg et al., 1995; Rinck & Becker, 2005). For example, while Helfinstein,
White, Bar-Haim & Fox (2008) demonstrated that socially anxious individuals were
biased towards threatening stimuli, Mansell et al. (1999) and Bradley et al. (1995)
deduced that in the absence of social-evaluative threat, high and low socially anxious
individuals did not differ in their attention to facial expressions. In a similar fashion,
Klumpp & Amir (2009) demonstrated an attentional bias with socially anxious
individuals and threatening stimuli, but only when the threatening stimuli were in the
bottom half of the computer monitor, thus calling into question if threatening stimuli need
to be placed in a specific location on a computer monitor to trigger an attentional bias.
Additionally, Weeks, Howell & Goldin (2013) found that regardless of positive or
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negative stimuli presented to social anxious individuals, eye contact was significantly
decreased when compared to their control counterparts.
As previously noted, attention bias to threat (e.g., disgust faces) is a cognitive
vulnerability factor for social anxiety that occurs in the early stages of information
processing (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016). Individuals with elevated levels of SAD
tend to exhibit elongated engagement towards threatening stimuli, but have also exhibited
late stage cognitive process following the presentation of threatening stimuli. This mixed
evidence with socially anxious individuals posits that individuals with SAD will
demonstrate greater disengagement times when presented with threat-congruent stimuli.
As in the case of studies that examine attention bias in depression, some of these
mixed findings may stem from the use of low intensity stimuli, such as words, versus
stimuli that better capture salient threat information such as facial expressions (Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997).
In summary, there is mixed evidence to suggest that anxious individuals both
support biased attention towards threatening (i.e.: disgust) stimuli (Weeks, Howell, &
Goldin, 2013; Schofield et al., 2012), and will demonstrate difficulty shifting away from
these stimuli once they are detected (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016; Schofield, 2012,
Sanchez et al., 2013, 2016).
2.3 Are biased attention allocation and disengagement difficulties disorder-specific risk
factors?
While literature on MDD and SAD suggests unique patterns of attention biases
and between the two disorders, there is a surprising dearth of work that examines such
biases in samples that show characteristics of both disorders. Selective processing of
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threatening stimuli (i.e.: disgust faces) at early stages of visual presentation appears to be
more characteristic to individuals with SAD, whereas individuals with MDD are instead
associated with selective attention to mood-congruent stimuli (i.e.: sad faces) (Çek,
Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Visual attention studies have
evidenced that a robust orientation bias toward threatening stimuli was evident in studies
that examine SAD, while MDD studies concluded a lack of orientation bias toward
threatening stimuli (Sears et al., 2011).
While advances have been made in the area of attention bias in SAD and MDD,
notable methodological limitations are also evident. Until recently, studies that examine
attention bias in both disorders have relied on behavioral measures such as the Stroop and
Dot Probe tasks that require participant to press a keyboard button or to verbalize a
response to detect attention. Such measures of attention reflect a mixture attention
processes and individual differences in motor response that obscure the role of attention
in SAD and MDD.
Studies that employ eye-tracking methods that directly and continuously measure
overt visual attention are largely unhindered by the inherent limitations of behavioral
reaction time measures (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012). This is because eye movements
are less susceptible to confounding processes of motor behavior, and allow the
continuous recording of attention unlike behavioral Stroop tasks and Dot-Probe tasks
(Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012). However, eye tracking studies have largely examined
biased attention engagement, rather than the deficits in attention disengagement among
depressed and socially anxious participants (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012; Weeks,
Howell, & Goldin, 2013; Kulke, Atkinson, & Braddick, 2015), because procedure for
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detecting biases in attention shifts were unavailable. Recent work by Sanchez (2013) has
provided one means of measuring visual attention shifting that may shed light on
attention shifting biases related to SAD and MDD.
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CHAPTER III
THE CURRENT STUDY

The current study examined the role of attentional biases in risk for MDD and
SAD and their co-occurrence using novel methodology developed by Sanchez and
colleagues (Sanchez et al., 2013). It was hypothesized that those with elevated MDD
symptoms and low SAD symptoms would show a difficulty disengaging from sad to
neutral faces. Similarly, it was hypothesized that individuals with elevated SAD and low
MDD symptoms would demonstrate slower disengagement times from disgust faces. It
was hypothesized that those with elevated symptoms of MDD and SAD would evidence
the greatest difficulty disengaging their attention from both stimulus types, as cognitive
theories of both MDD and SAD support the presentation of mood-congruent stimuli (sad
and disgust faces) would lend to a longer disengagement period.
3.1 Hypotheses
H1: Individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms will show a
difficulty disengaging from sad to neutral faces.
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H2: Individuals with elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms will exhibit
slower disengagement from disgust to neutral faces.
H3: Individuals with elevated symptoms of MDD and SAD will evidence the greatest
difficulty disengaging their attention from sad and disgust stimuli.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS

4.1 Participants
No study to date has examined differences between groups with elevated MDD
and/or SAD symptoms with respect to their ability to disengage from disorder-specific
stimuli. Therefore, we based our power analysis on feasibility of recruiting a sample of
affected participants based on logistic constraints. Our sensitivity analysis showed that a
sample of N=45 is sufficient to a detect small-to-medium effect size (f =.25) across study
hypothesis at a power = .80 and an α=.05.
Participants were recruited from Cleveland State University’s undergraduate
students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology (PSY 101), whereby these participants
would receive research credit for their participation in the study, in partial fulfillment of
the course. The sample consisted of 103 undergraduate students attending Cleveland
State University and community participants, with 51% female. This sample’s (N=103)
eye-tracking data was then identified as either trackable or untrackable, leading to an
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overall usable sample size of N=98. The subjects were all adults (Mage = 22.85) and
primarily Caucasian (67%). The remainder of the racial composition was as follows:
African American (23%), Latino (5%), and Other (3.9%).
4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Demographics
Participants completed a brief survey that assessed basic demographic
information such as age, sex, and racial background.
4.2.2 Major Depressive Disorder Scale
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) is a 20item scale measuring depressive symptoms in the general population (Radloff,
1977). Participants made responses on a 4-point Likert scale to such prompts as “I
was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.” Prior research demonstrated
the CES-D to be a reliable and valid measure of depression (α > .85) (Hann,
Winter, & Jacobsen, 1999; Radloff, 1977).
4.2.3 Social Anxiety Disorder Scale
The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) contains 20 items which are
rated from 0 (not at all characteristic or true of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic
or true of me). Items are self-statements describing one's typical cognitive,
affective, or behavioral reaction to a variety of situations requiring social
interaction in dyads or groups (e.g., going to a party, talking to an attractive
member of the opposite gender, expressing one's feelings). The SIAS was scored
by summing the ratings (after reversing the 3 positively-worded items), and total
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scores range from 0 to 80. Higher scores represented higher levels of social
interactional anxiety (Mattick & Clarke, 1989).
4.2.4 Eye-tracking Measures
Participants viewed pictorial face pairs that comprised emotional and
neutral expressions from the same individual. Faces were taken from the
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database (Lundqvisk, Flykt, &
Öhman, 1998). Based on a similar design from Sanchez et al. (2013), KDEF
frontal view pictures that displayed discrete expressions of happiness, disgust, and
sadness were used. The emotional faces were chosen based on the (1) specificity
of the emotion being portrayed and (2) being of equal intensity across the three
emotion categories. A total of 24 happy, 24 sad, and 24 disgust face stimuli (12
men and 12 women for each emotion category, along with each actor’s neutral
expression stimulus) were utilized for the eye tracking (ET) tasks.
4.3 Experimental Protocol
4.3.1 Design
The ET task consisted of 72 trials (24 happy-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, and
24 disgust-neutral pairs). Emotional and neutral faces were equally presented on
the left and right side of the screen across trials. The main experiment was
preceded by two practice trials to orient participants to the task. The experimental
design was similar to the one used in Sanchez et al. (2013). More specifically,
each trial of the ET task started with a black screen for 500 ms, followed by a
fixation cross in the middle of the screen for another 500 ms. A single, random
digit (i.e., 1-9) replaced the fixation cross and remained on the screen for 1,000
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ms; participants were instructed to say this number aloud so as to ensure their
attention was oriented to the center of the screen prior to the presentation of the
face pairs. Immediately after the digit offset, a pair of faces were presented on the
screen for 3,000 ms. Participants were instructed to view these faces naturally, as
if at home watching television. During this free-viewing period, indices of
naturalistic stimulus processing assessed the following: initial orienting, fixation
frequency and fixation percentage bias score.
The engagement-disengagement task followed the free-viewing period.
This task was comprised of three conditions: one-third of the trials assessed
attentional engagement with the emotional face in the pair; one-third of the trials
assessed where participants disengaged from the emotional face and engaged with
the neutral face in the presented pair; and one-third are “control trials.” The
control trials consisted of a free-viewing task and were followed by a fixation
cross denoting the next trial. For the emotional engagement trials, after the 3,000ms free-viewing period, the face pair remained on the screen until the participant
fixated on the neutral face; this was referred to as the “wait for fixation” period.
Once a fixation was deployed onto the neutral face for at least 100 ms, stimulus
presentation continued and a rectangular or oval frame encompassed the
emotional face. Participants were instructed to shift their gaze as quickly as
possible toward the frame and indicate the shape by pressing one of two keys on a
keyboard corresponding to “rectangle” or “oval.” This engagement condition
measured how long participants took to disengage attention from the neutral face
and engage with the emotional face. For the disengagement trials, a similar
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procedure was used. However, instead of having participants fixate toward the
neutral face during the “wait for fixation” period, the trial proceeded once a
fixation was deployed to the emotional face in the pair. Furthermore, after initial
fixation to the emotional face, the rectangle or oval frame surrounded the neutral
face. Thus, disengagement was determined by the amount of time needed to shift
gaze from the emotional face toward the neutral face. All three trial conditions
were randomly presented, and both types of frames were equal in their
presentation and whether or not they appeared in the left and right positions
during the engagement and disengagement conditions.
4.3.2 Eye-tracking apparatus
Eye movements are recorded using a Sensomotoric Instruments (SMI)
RED250 (N=41) or a Tobii-branded 3X-120 (N=57) mobile eye tracking unit.
Each participant’s eye position to the stimulus monitor was captured from an
infrared light that is sent, via a camera, to the participant’s eyes, and gaze position
at any given time was determined by the eye acting as a “retro-reflector,”
extrapolating eye position from pupil illumination and reflection off of the cornea.
Pupil reflection moved with the eye so as to determine the “center” of the eye at
all times; corneal reflection remained fixed so as to be used as an anchor point for
the head with respect to the infrared camera. Both eye tracking systems provided
a 120 Hz measure of eye-gaze position, while both stimulus presentation and eye
movement recording were conducted using SMI Experiment Center software.
Visual fixations were defined as gaze resting within 0.5-1.0° visual angle for at
least 100 ms (Manor & Gordon, 2003) within pre-determined areas of interest
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(AOIs). AOIs comprised the entirety of the facial stimuli for both the freeviewing and engage-disengage tasks; a “target” AOI encompassed the non-frame
facial image during the “wait for fixation” trials. Once a definable, 100-ms
fixation was recorded within this AOI, the engagement-disengagement task
commenced.
4.4 Analytic Plan
Following data collection, all statistical analyses were completed using IBM SPSS
Statistics software (IBM, Inc., 2013). Descriptive statistics, including range, mean, and
standard deviations were calculated, and correlations were performed. Symptom groups
were created based on previously validated cut-offs on the CES-D and the SIAS. A score
of 20 or greater has been determined to be the threshold for “high depression” criteria on
the CES-D (Hann, Winter, & Jacobsen, 1999; Radloff, 1977), while a score of 34 or
greater was determined to be the threshold for “high social anxiety” criteria (Mattick &
Clarke, 1989). Despite efforts to oversample for social anxiety, only three groups
emerged based on the above noted criteria: a control group (N=66), a high depression
group (N=21), and a high depression and high social anxiety group (N=11).
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Bivariate correlations are presented in Table IV. Pearson correlations were
conducted to examine bivariate correlations between all study variables. Age and sex
were found to be uncorrelated with SIAS scores, CES-D scores, and disengagement from
sad or disgust stimuli and thus were not entered as potential covariates in analyses.
Age and gender negatively correlated with one another, r=-.26, p<.01, which is
indicative of younger participants being male, while older participants were female. As
predicted, CES-D scores correlated with disengagement from sad stimuli, r=.29, p<.05,
indicating a longer disengagement times from sad stimuli was associated with elevated
depression symptoms.
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Intriguingly, disengagement times from sad stimuli positively correlated with disgust
stimuli, r=.63, p<.01, indicating that individuals who took longer to disengagement from
one negative valenced stimuli also took longer to disengage from the other negative
valenced stimuli. It should be noted that these correlations consist of the control group,
high MDD participants, and high MDD and high SAD participants.
5.2 Hypotheses Testing
H1: Individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms will show
a difficulty disengaging from sad to neutral faces.
The first aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of
individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms when presented with
a sad to neutral face sequence. Per the hypothesis, a repeated measure ANOVA in which
the within-subject factor was the stimulus type (disgust vs. sad faces) and the betweensubject factor was disorder group membership based on symptom levels (control group,
high MDD, or high MDD & high SAD) revealed no significant differences in stimulus
types as a function of elevated MDD, SAD or MDD and SAD symptoms, F(2, 92) =1.36,
p=.262, η2=.029. Follow up analyses revealed that participants who were classified as
high MDD on average did not vary in disengagement from sad stimuli time (M= 250.22,
SD= 72.98) when compared to the control group (M=247.36, SD= 68.52).
H2: Individuals with elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms will exhibit slower
disengagement from disgust faces.
The second aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of
individuals’ elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms when presented with a
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disgust to neutral face sequence. Due to study limitations and demographics, a sample
that consisted of elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms was not attained and
was thus not analyzed.
H3: Individuals with elevated symptoms of MDD and SAD will evidence the
greatest difficulty disengaging their attention from both stimulus types.
The third aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of
individuals with elevated SAD and elevated MDD symptoms when presented with both
sad and disgust stimuli. The aim of this testing was to predict disengagement times from
sad and disgust stimuli relevant to SAD and MDD symptomology.
The repeated measures ANOVA examined group differences in their ability to
disengage from disorder-specific stimuli failed to show group differences, F(2, 92) =1.36,
p=.26, η2=.03. This finding is indicative of controls, participants high in MDD, and
participants high in MDD and SAD do not differ significantly in disengagement time
from sad or disgust stimuli. It can then be hypothesized that regardless of individuals
specific diagnostic groups, disengagement practices were not impacted by elevated social
anxiety or depressive symptoms. Although statistical significance was not observed
between controls, the elevated depressive group, and the elevated depressive and anxious
group, and stimuli types (sad and disgust faces), the main effect of being exposed to a
specific stimuli demonstrated a trend-level difference F(1, 92) = 3.79, p=.06, η2=.04.
This finding suggests a trend for longer disengagement times in response to sad relative
to disgust faces.

29

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

With the high prevalence of comorbid social anxiety and depression diagnoses, it
was imperative to understand the link between cognitive risk and maintenance factors of
both social anxiety and major depressive disorder symptoms, leading to a potential
identification of delivering existing treatments more effectively. The present study
examined disengagement practices from negatively valenced stimuli, namely sad and
disgusted faces. Specifically, it examined the relationship between the symptomology of
social anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and participants’ disengagement times
after viewing disorder-specific stimuli.
As a result of a limited sample of participants who experienced low MDD and
high SAD symptomology, three groups were created for data analysis. The first group
consisted of control participants who did not score highly on either the CES-D scale or
the SIAS scale. The second group consisted of participants who scored highly on the
CES-D but did not score highly on the SIAS. The third group consisted of participants
who scored highly on both the CES-D and the SIAS. Although these three groups, with
an increase in participant size, could have given way to a true interaction study,
participant sample numbers were not great enough to analyze a true interaction
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experience. As such, these three groups were then analyzed with their respective
disengagement times from negatively valenced stimuli exhibiting either a sad face or a
disgust face.
The first aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of
individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms when presented with
a sad to neutral face disengagement sequence. It was hypothesized that these individuals
would demonstrate difficulty disengaging from a sad face towards a neutral face. As
research conducted by Joorman and Gotlib (2007) has demonstrated, depressed
individuals present with difficulty disengaging from stimuli that is emotionally relevant
to themselves. This study examined how a negatively valenced stimuli would impact the
disengagement practices in depressed individuals. The overall goal of this hypothesis was
to expand upon further research by incorporating sad and disgust stimuli to participants
who scored highly on the CES-D.
Individuals with depression have been observed to use schemas to exhibit a
systematic bias in the processing of their environmental stimuli or information that is
relevant to their current symptomology. As a result of this attentional bias, depressed
individuals have been observed attending selectively to negative stimuli in their
environment and interpreting neutral and ambiguous stimuli in a schema-congruent way
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). The first aim of this study was to confirm if this attentional
bias was observed in our sample of participants.
Literature to date suggests that individuals with high MDD symptomology should
demonstrate longer times to disengage from sad stimuli (Sanchez, Romero, & De Raedt,
2017). Interestingly, individuals in our sample who reported high depressive symptoms

31

(scores greater than or equal to 20 on the CES-D) did not show a difference in
disengagement practices when compared to the control group of participants. Indeed, this
is consistent with the current eye-tracking literature, which discussed mixed results
among studies. As demonstrated by Gotlib and colleagues (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004;
Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), clinically depressed
participants exhibited an attentional bias toward sad faces. In contrast, Rinck & Becker
(2005) failed to show attentional biases among depressed participants who were exposed
to negatively valenced words, and Mogg et al. (1995) failed to show an attentional bias
among depressed participants when these participants were exposed to negatively
valenced faces. However, individuals who reported high depressive symptomology and
low social anxiety symptomology disengaged faster from the sad stimuli when compared
to the combination group of high social anxiety and high depressive symptomology
individuals. Again, this is contradictory to the current literature as it was expected for the
depressive-symptomatic group to exhibit longer disengagement times from symptomspecific stimuli, such as sad faces. In a series of studies by Gotlib and Joormann (2010),
participants who were experiencing a depressive episode demonstrated longer
disengagement times when exposed to negatively valenced stimuli that was congruent to
their depressive symptomology. Similarly, research conducted by Sanchez and colleagues
(2013) evidenced that depressed participants demonstrated a difficulty with disengaging
visual attention away from sad faces. One potential explanation for this observed
correlation rests in the notion that individuals suffering from comorbid depression and
social anxiety symptoms could take longer to disengage from any type of negatively
valenced stimuli, regardless if it resonates with the individual’s symptomology.
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The second aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of
individuals with elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms. It was hypothesized
that these individuals would exhibit slower disengagement from the presented faces.
Cognitive theories of SAD posit that the main process of SAD is self-directed attention
triggered by social situations, with a corresponding withdrawal of adaptive attention to
positive external cues (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Current
evidence suggests that SAD will increase attentional threat biases. Studies have supported
this assumption by showing that individuals with a high level of social anxiety tend to
display an attentional bias towards external threats, and a greater likelihood of favoring
the threatening meaning of ambiguous cues (Peschard & Philippot, 2015). Thus, it would
be expected to observe slower disengagement times in individuals with SAD
symptomology when they are presented with the disgust stimuli. Due to the small amount
of participants who scored highly on the SIAS (equal to or above a 34 for social anxiety
indication) and with the understanding that these high scoring SIAS individuals also
presented with high levels of MDD on the CES-D (equal to or above 20 for major
depressive disorder indication), this aim was not able to be analyzed. Given the current
study and its present findings, one would hypothesize that with a larger sample of strictly
socially anxious individuals, these individuals would demonstrate slower disengagement
times from disgust stimuli.
The third aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of
individuals with elevated SAD and MDD symptoms when presented with both sad and
disgust stimuli. It was hypothesized that individuals with elevated symptoms of MDD
and SAD would evidence the greatest difficulty disengaging their attention from both
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stimulus types. Given the previous research on attentional bias in individuals with MDD
and SAD, it was expected that these participants will demonstrate the longest amount of
time to disengage from both stimuli, as cognitive models of both disorders posit
disengagement difficulties.
Across the three groups, a trend emerged that participants in general tended to
disengage faster from the disgust stimuli, but did not demonstrate a significant change
when participants were presented with the sad stimuli. Additionally, individuals with
high social anxiety and high depressive symptomology were slower to disengage
regardless of the negative stimuli presented to them when compared to the control group.
This could be explained due to a hallmark feature of socially anxious individuals is that
they are constantly searching out feedback from their peers, thus these negative valenced
stimuli resonate with their symptomology, eliciting a longer disengagement time from the
presented stimuli.
One interesting aspect of disengagement practices arose with group 3, which
consisted of individuals with both high social anxiety symptomology and high depressive
symptomology (N=11). When looking at disengagement practices, the presence of social
anxiety inhibited disengagement from both sad and disgust stimuli, leading to an overall
longer average time to disengage from presented stimuli. This could be explained by the
cognitive model of socially anxious individuals, with SAD being associated with quick
detection and immediate attention to relevant stimuli, even when stimuli are presented
subliminally (LeMoult, Yoon, & Joormann, 2012b). Thus, if socially anxious individuals
engage with stimuli that are either judgmental, threatening, or offering a type of negative
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feedback, they will first engage with the negative stimuli and then take longer to divert
their gaze to from the negative stimuli to the neutral stimuli.
However, the mean difference between our high CES-D and high SIAS group and
our control group was not significant, with an approximate difference between the two
groups at 63 ms. This practice was not observed in the depression-only group, which
indicated that the disengagement from sad and disgust stimuli is specific to individuals
with depression coupled with social anxiety.
As such, individuals with high CES-D scores demonstrated disengagement from
sad faces on average M=250.22 ms., and demonstrated disengagement from disgust faces
on average M=224.78 ms. Contrary to our hypothesis, no mean differences were
discerned when comparing our control group’s average sad stimuli disengagement time
to our high depression sad stimuli disengagement time (M=250.22, SD=72.98).
Additionally, no discernable differences between disgust disengagement times were
observed between the elevated MDD group and our control group.
6.1 Limitations
The findings for this study should be considered with several limitations. First, the
sample for this study was comprised of an undergraduates and community sample, which
limits the ability to generalize the findings from this study to clinical populations.
Second, data collection was varied between two different laboratory settings utilizing two
different branded eye-trackers. Out of 103 participants, 42 participants were exposed to
the SMI eye-tracker, while the remainder of the participants were exposed to the Tobii
eye-tracking system. Thus, it is unclear if this mechanical difference impacted
disengagement times from sad and disgust stimuli. The most glaring limitation of this
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study was lack of participants suffering from social anxiety symptomology without
complementary depressive symptomology to fulfill the original study hypothesis. The
main aim of our study was to further understand the disengagement practices of
individuals with elevated social anxiety symptoms. Without a sample of strictly socially
anxious individuals, this study was unable to further the literature regarding
disengagement practices and disordered-specific stimuli and their relationship to social
anxiety. Without a larger sample of strictly socially anxious individuals, the study is not
generalizable to clinical populations, and cannot help to further identify cognitive risk
factors or improve upon therapeutic delivery techniques.
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research
The design of this study reveals several limitations that could be addressed in
future research. The first is recruiting a clinical population sample in hopes of examining
the clinical implications of eye-tracking. The second is recruiting individuals who are
suffering from social anxiety without a depression component. This would allow study
results to be generalizable to socially anxious populations, potentially leading to revised
delivery of treatments. Lastly, there is room to explore additional stimuli that might cause
increased disengagement times in socially anxious and depressed individuals.
6.3 Strengths and Clinical Implications
The present study was able to examine a novel addition to the present literature.
Although it has been well researched that individuals with high depressive
symptomology will demonstrate an attentional bias towards negatively valenced stimuli,
specifically sad faces, we were unable to confirm this attentional bias. The elevated MDD
participants did not demonstrate considerable differences in attentional bias towards
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specific stimuli when compared to our control group. A second novel finding that would
add to the present literature involves the disengagement practices of individuals with both
elevated SAD and MDD. These individuals demonstrated an overlap of disengagement
practices by exhibiting a significantly longer time to direct their attention away from both
sad and disgust stimuli. This finding, if replicated with a clinical population, can add to
the plethora of therapy deliverance techniques with regards to individuals who are
diagnosed with both SAD and MDD.
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Table II. Means and standard deviations of study variables

Measure

Mean

Standard Deviation

Age

22.85

8.89

SIAS score

35.49

16.29

CES-D score

16.71

11.66

Disengagement Sad (MS) overall

255.06

84.42

Disengagement Disgust (MS) overall

244.31

83.82

Disengagement Sad
Control Group

247.36

68.52

Disengagement Sad
High CES-D

250.22

72.98

Disengagement Sad
High CES-D and High SIAS

310.50

155.35

Disengagement Disgust Control Group

245.29

83.64

Disengagement Disgust High CES-D

224.78

56.95

Disengagement Disgust High CES-D and High SIAS

275.66

119.57

Note. Social anxiety was measured using the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; threshold
for social anxiety is equal to or above 34); depression was measured using the Center for
Epidemiological Study, Depression scale (CES-D; threshold for depression is equal to or above
20); disengagement sad and disgust were measured in milliseconds.
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Table III. Demographic Characteristics
Study Sample
Characteristic
N = 103 (%)
Gender
Female

50.5

Male

49.5

Age
18-29

87.2

30-44

6.9

45-63

4.9

Race
African American

23.3

Caucasian

67.0

East Asian

0.0

Latino

4.9

Native American

0.0

Other

3.9

Pacific Islander

0.0

South Asian

1.0
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APPENDIX B
1. Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS)
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2. Center for Epidemiological Studies—Depression Scale (CES-D)
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APPENDIX C
Eye tracking Stimuli

Male Disgusted with frame
frame

Female Disgusted without

Female Sad with frame

Male Sad without frame
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